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LABOR AND THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT
ROBERT C. BARNARD AND ROBERT W. GRAAIm*
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less."--LEwis CARROLL.
Advisedly has the "boycott"' been characterized as "a chameleon
that is impossible of definition."' 2 Only the epithet "secondary boy-
cott ' 3 has perhaps occasioned more intricate judicial gymnastics. 4 Jus-
tice Steinert, writing for the Washington Supreme Court, has recently
observed with perspicacity that "the term 'secondary boycott' is of
somewhat vague signification and has no precise and exclusive denota-
*The authors wish to express their gratitude for the helpful suggestions
and criticisms made by Donald E. Leland of the Seattle bar.
'For a general discussion of the role of the "boycott" in labor disputes,
see BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930); CoMnvoNs AND ANDREws,
PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (3d ed. 1927); FRANKFURTER AND GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE
(1913); OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS (1927); WITTE,
THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932); WoLIvAN, THE BOYCOTT IN
AMaERICAN TRADE UNIONS IN JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTOR-
ICAL ANm PoLrncAL SCENCE (1916); Notes (1918) 31 HA~v. L. REv. 482, (1921)
34 HARv. L. REV. 880, (1920) 6 A. L. R. 909, (1922) 16 A. L. R. 651, (1923)
27 A. L. R. 651, (1924) 32 A. L. R. 779, (1935) 99 A. L. R. 533, (1938) 116
A. L. R. 484.
2KEs;NER, DER ORGANIZATIONSZWANG, 344.
8A collection and discussion of the definitions of the "secondary boy-
cott" may be found in FRANKFURTER Am GREENE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
43-46; OAKES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 602 et seq.; WTTE, op. cit. supra note
1, at 38-43, 296-297. The "secondary boycott" is discussed in Feinberg,
Analysis of the New York Law of Secondary Boycott (1936) 6 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 209; Erskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor Dis-
putes (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 456; Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in
Labor Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341; Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in
Labor Disputes-The Secondary Boycott (1939) 1 LA. L. REv. 277. See
also Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682, 700; Cooper,
The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 MIc. L. REV. 73; Notes (1921)
30 YALE L. J. 280, (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 578, (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 83,
(1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 284, (1939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 493, (1908) 16 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 85, (1909) 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 707, (1911) 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 748,
(1928) 52 A. L. R. 1144.
'An entertaining example of judicial legerdemain may be found in
Lohse Patent Door' Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997, 1012 (1908)
where it was stated that, although the publication of a boycott (secondary)
could not be enjoined, nevertheless the declaration of such would be
since "if the boycott were enjoined there would be no occasion for com-
plaint against its publication."
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tion."5 In the field of labor relations, as in other branches of the law,
bench and bar have leaned on the comforting pillar of "lump concept"6
thinking which has more than once done yeoman's service for judi-
cial reasoning and analysis.' Truly has there been more than one black-
robed Humpty Dumpty whose use of the phrase "secondary boycott"
has meant "just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
An elementary familiarity with the dogma of labor law discloses the
touchstone of the law of the "secondary boycott"-its illegality., The
The definitions of "secondary boycott" like those of "boycott" are
"nearly as varied as the cases defining the term." See Truax v. Bisbee
Local, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121, 124 (1918). A few courts have termed
picketing only the "offending" employer a "secondary boycott." Ellis v.
Journeymen Barbers, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111, 113 (1922); Bomes V.
Providence Local, 51 R. I. 499, 155 Atl. 581, 583 (1931); cf. Kitty Kelly Shoe
Corp. v. United Retail Employees, 125 N. J. Eq. 250, 5 A. (2d) 682, 684
(1939). Other courts have refused or found it unnecessary to define the
term. Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912, 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897);
Seattle Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011, 1014 (C. C. Cal. 1905); Wilson
& Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2d) 948, 952 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). In other cases union
activities "which in their essence are not distinguishable" from the sec-
ondary boycott have been considered. Pacific Typesetting Co. v. Intern'l
Typo. Union, 125 Wash. 273, 283, 216 Pac. 358, 362 (1923). See also O'Brien
v. Fackenthal, 5 F. (2d) 389, 391 (C. C. A 6th, 1925) (Union activities were
"governed by the underlying principle" of the secondary boycott); Scav-
enger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825, 833 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936)
("The picketing was well-nigh a boycott . . ."); Moore Forging Co. v.
McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919, 922 (1923) (Union activities were
"in substance a boycott . . ."). The term "secondary picketing", obviously
an offspring of the "secondary boycott", has recently been coined to de-
scribe a familiar type of "secondary boycott". Evening Times v. Amer.
Newspaper Guild, 122 N. J. Eq. 545, 195 Ati. 378, 379 (1937); Mitnick v.
Furniture Workers. 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 Atl. 553, 554 (1938); Alliance Auto
Service v. Cohen, 35 D. & C. 373 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1939).
6United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 491, 93 P. (2d) 772.
779 (1939).
'Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 COL.
L. REv. 431.
'For a critical appraisal of symbolistic thinking in various branches of
the law see ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) 34; ARNOLD, THE
FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) Ch. VII; FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 34-35, 42-43.
'Typical judicial expressions may be found in Blandford v. Duthie, 147
Md. 388, 128 Atl. 138, 144 (1925) ("In addition the defendants violated the
law in enforcing a secondary boycott"); Kitty Kelly Shoe Corp. v. United
Retail Employees, 125 N. J. Eq. 250, 5 A. (2d) 682, 684 (1939) ("This is
unlawful and constitutes secondary boycott"); Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 914 (1937) (Lehman, J., concurring, ...
peaceful picketing of plaintiff's place of business . . . is lawful. This is
not a 'secondary boycott"'); United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash.
474, 491, 93 P. (2d) 772, 780 (1939) ("... secondary boycott . . .will be
restrained by a court of equity").
Contrasted with the overwhelming bulk of statements that a "secondary
boycott" is illegal only the following statements by the California courts
have been found which verbally recognize that a "secondary boycott"
may be legal:
"In this respect this court recognizes no substantial distinction
between the so-called primary and secondary boycott. Each rests
upon the right of the union to withdraw its patronage from its
employer, and to induce by fair means any and all other persons
[VOL. 15
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term has been the function of a desired result rather than a 'functional
characteristic of any given fact situation or situations. Identical fact
situations have been found to be and not to be a "secondary boycott"
and their legality has varied with this nominalism. 9 In judicial calculus
"secondary boycott" equals illegality. This tautology of measuring
illegal relationships in terms of "secondary boycotts" and defining
these in turn by reference to legality deserves to be equally as no-
torious as the philosophical regressions inhering in the merrry-go-round
of the renvoiY
The traditional definition of the "secondary boycott" is contained
in Justice Pitney's opinion in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
wherein he states:
"The substance of the matters here complained of is an in-
terference with complainant's interstate trade, intended to
have coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what
is commonly known as 'secondary boycott'; that is, a combina-
tion not merely to refrain from dealing with the complainant,
or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant's cus-
tomers to refrain ('primary boycott'), but to exercise coercive
pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order
to do the same, and, in exercise of those means, as -the unions
would have the unquestioned right to withhold their patronage
from a third person who continued to deal with their employers,
so they have the unquestioned right to notify such third person
that they will withdraw their patronage if he continues so to deal."
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, 327 (1909).
"The legality of a secondary boycott, peacefully conducted and
without picketing was sustained.. ." Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App.(2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190, 194 (1938).
'In . . . three states (California, Arizona and Montana) . . .
the courts have refused injunctions against the secondary boy-
cott . . 21 Citizens-News v. Connolly, 2 L. R. R. Man. 856, 857, 1
C. C. H. Labor Cases 672 (Ca]. Super. Ct. 1938).
It is sometimes stated that courts of other jurisdictions have recognized
the legality of some "secondary boycotts" but the decisions of these juris-
dictions contain no such explicit declarations. See Citizens-News v. Con-
nolly, supra, at 857; United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, supra, at 491,
93 P. (2d) at 780.
See also Weil & Co. v. Doe, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (1938).
OCompare Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841 (1914), with
General Bottle Co. v. Oneto, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 348 (1939). Compare Mitnick
v. Furniture Workers, 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 Atl 553 (1938), with Sunset
Poultry Market v. United Cannery Workers, 5 L. R. 1. 380 (Cal. Super.
Ct 1939). Compare Quinton's Market v. Patterson, - Mass. -, 21
N. E. (2d) 546 (1939), with Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81
P. (2d) 190 (1938). Compare Meyer Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, 18
Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 457 (1916), with Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281,
11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937). Compare Perry Truck Lines v. Intern'l Team-
sters, 5 L. R. R. 163, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1292 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1939), with
Reardon v. Caton, 178 N. Y. Supp. 713 (1919), and Reardon v. Intern'l
Mercantile Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 722 (1919). Compare Patterson & Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 11 Pa. Dist. R. 500 (1902), with Bossert v. Dhuy,
221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) reheaiing denied, 227 N. Y. 585, 118
N. E. 1052 (1917).10See Lorenzen, Renvoi Revisited (1938) 51 HAav. L. REv. 1165.
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to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from com-
plainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should
they deal with it.""
Similarly the Washington Supreme Court reiterates:
"While the term 'secondary boycott' is of somewhat vague
signification and has no precise and exclusive denotation, the
courts, both Federal and state, are agreed that any combina-
tion will be held to be a secondary boycott if its purpose and
effect are to coerce customers or patrons, through fear of loss
or bodily harm, to withhold or withdraw their business rela-
tions from the employer who is under attack.'
12
But neither these nor other judicial expositions of the "secondary boy-
cott" in terms of "coercion" 13 offer much help in attempting to dif-
ferentiate analytically a "primary" from a "secondary boycott."14
Analytically a "primary boycott" would seem to be concerned ex-
clusively with the relationships between two parties, i. e., between the
employer (R) and his employees (E). Logically it should make no
difference whether the change in relationships between them takes the
form of a withdrawal from employment or cessation of business deal-
ings, the first of these alternatives being universally referred to as the
"strike" and the second usually being termed the "boycott" or a
"primary boycott.""
By a parity of analysis it would seem that wherever the alteration
of relationships proximately sought involves those between third parties
(T) and R, the bounds of the true "primary boycott" have been passed.
And, for purposes of logic, it seems immaterial how the disruption of
those relationships is sought and of what they consist. The introduc-
tion of T into the area of conflict for the purpose of influencing R,
results in a "secondary boycott" in an analytical sense. The definition
of the "secondary boycott" in terms of "coercion" employed to bring T
"254 U. S. 443, 466 (1920).
1United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 490. 93 P. (2d) 772,
779 (1939).
"r"A secondary boycott may be defined as a combination to cause loss to
one person by coercing others against their will to withdraw from him
beneficial business intercourse..." Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union,
- Iowa -, 284 N. W. 126 (1939). Similar expressions may be found in
A. F. of L. v. Buck Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 748,
761 (1909); Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988 (1910); Pierce v.
Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, 327 (1909); Perry Truck Lines
v. Intern'l Teamsters, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1292, 1293, 5 L. R. R. 163
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1939); Beck v. Railway Teamsters, 118 Mich. 497, 77
N. W. 13. 24-25 (1898); Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97
N. W. 663, 666 (1903); Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114
S. W. 997 (1908); Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181,
65 Atl. 226 (1906).
1Attempted differentiation between the "boycott" and the "secondary
boycott" may be found in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 466 (1920); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn.,
274 U. S. 37, 50 (1927): Citizens-News v. Connolly, 2 L. R. R. Man. 856,
857 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1938); cf. Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70,
103 Pac. 324, 327 (1909).
-Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, 327 (1909).
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into the arena of combat instead of in terms of its analytical constituents
can result only in the determination of the legality of a given state
of facts in accordance with whether or not the court is of the opinion
that the pressure exerted upon T amounts to "coercion." Truly is this
a test which can be and is used with impunity to cloak the opinions
and economic predilections of the courts which employ it1 6-- a test by
which, and only by which, can the various decisions as to what con-
stitutes a "secondary boycott" be reconciled.
Our inquiry will be as to which of these "secondary boycotts" the
courts have held legal and which have been "coerced" into illegality,
together with some indication of the determinative factors, if any,
which have led the courts to a given result.
The problem of the "secondary boycott" is in fact dual, its aspects
being (a) the role of the third party against whom pressure is directed,
and (b) the nature of the pressure employed. Accordingly, a twofold
classification of the cases will be attempted, following which some of
the possible trends that may be taken by judicial thought in working
out the solution to these problems will be considered. For the purposes
of treatment of the decided cases and to clarify our own thinking we
propose to employ the term "secondary boycott" in an analytical sense,
using it to designate any situation wherein pressure is exerted upon T,
irrespective of its nature and irrespective of whether or not the courts
have labeled it a "secondary boycott."
In line with the analysis suggested above, it is to be observed that
in so far as purely peaceful picketing of R's place of business by E
seeks to persuade customers (C), i.e., third parties (T), not to patronize
R and other employees (E') not to work for R, such picketing con-
tains at least the analytical elements of the "secondary boycott" since T
has effectively been brought into the picture. It is, however, recog-
nized that peaceful picketing of R by E17 has never been designated
by the courts as a "secondary boycott";18 and recently the United
States Supreme Court in "Tkornhill v. Alabama" has enshrouded with
6"What each individual member of a labor organization may lawfully
do, acting singly, becomes an unlawful conspiracy when done by them
collectively. Singly, they may boycott; collectively they cannot. The in-
dividual boycott is lawful, because it can accomplish little or nothing.
The collective boycott is unlawful, because it might accomplish some-
thing." Caldwell, J., dissenting in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed.
912, 931 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 485 (1920).
"TFor a discussion of the Washington cases involving picketing of R by E
see Comments (1930) 5 WASH. L. REV. 126, (1940) 15 WAsH. L. R v. 47.
"Cf. Kitty Kelly Shoe Corp. v. United Retail Employees, 125 N. J. Eq.
250, 5 A. (2d) 682 (1939), where it was held that picketing of R by The
New Jersey League of Women Shoppers in sympathy with the striking
employees constituted a "secondary boycott."
2960 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940). Accord: Carlson v. California, 60 Sup. Ct. 746
(1940).
1940]
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constitutional sanctity E's right peacefully to picket R,' a right which
the Washington court had finally recognized without qualification in
Yakima v. Gorkam" upon the grounds of legislative policy. Accord-
ingly, we but designate this situation in passing as a type of "sec-
ondary boycotts" under the various anti-injunction acts 22 has been
The procedural question as to the enjoinability of this or other "sec-
ondary boycotts" under the various anti-injunction acts22 has been
conceived to be beyond the scope of this discussion.- A consideration of
-'The view of the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama,
60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940), may be compared with earlier statements as to the
legality of picketing. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council
257 U. S. 184, 205 (1921), where passing through a picket line was called
"running the gauntlet." Cf. Atchison Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (C. C.
Iowa 1905), where it is stated:
"There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any
more than there can be chaste vulgarity or peaceful mobbing, or
lawful lynching."
"200 Wash. 564, 94 P. (2d) 180 (1939).
-A discussion of the anti-injunction acts may be found in Feinberg,
loc. cit. supra note 3, Hellerstein, loc. cit. supra note 3; Smith, loc. cit.
supra note 3; Etter, Statutory Definitions of "Labor Dispute" (1940) 19
ORE. L. REV. 201; Smith and DeLancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism
(1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 987.
"These statutes were designed to prevent the issuance of preliminary
injunctions which frequently decided a labor dispute before the case could
be tried on its merits. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, Op. cit. supra note 1 at
200-201. The uniformity with which injunctive relief has been sought in
the decided cases testifies to the ineffectiveness of monetary damage in
the bargaining struggle and to the fact that "damages in cases of this
kind are very difficult, if not impossible, of correct mathematical calcula-
tion." Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Intern'l Teamsters, 5 L. R. R. 80 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1939). In but few cases have damages been sought or allowed. See
Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936);
Martineau v. Foley, 231 Mass. 220, 120 N. E. 445 (1918); Gatzow v. Buening,
106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003 (1900). These anti-injunction statutes purport
to be purely procedural; they contain no substantive provisions and, except
where the statute explicitly states that "nothing herein shall be construed
to legalize a secondary boycott"-Wis. STAT. (1939) § 103.53-the sub-
stantive law would appear to be unaffected. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Cohen,
34 D. & C. (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1938). The continued granting of injunctions in
situations traditionally viewed as "secondary boycotts" warrants the gen-
eralization that "secondary boycotts" are not "labor disputes" within
these statutes. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, 108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939) ; Evening Times
v. Amer. Newspaper Guild, 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598 (1938); United
Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939). Contra:
Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. Intern'l Ass'n, 29 F. Supp. 15 (E. D. Mo. 1939);
Hydrox Co. v. Doe, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1937); Davega-City Radio, Inc.
v. Randau, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (1938); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Cohen, 34 D. & C.
582 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1938). However, these statutes appear to have had a
profound effect, even though indirect, upon the substantive law. So clear
a declaration of legislative policy cannot be lightly glossed over. Enjoin-
able conduct must a fortiori be illegal but non-enjoinable conduct is not
of necessity legal. Some courts, however, have indulged in the non
sequitur that non-enjoinable conduct must be legal, and it appears that
such dicta is worming its way into the substantive law. For example, in
U. S. v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600, 603, 604 (E. D. Mo. 1940) it is said that
"the purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to legalize and sanction the
use of peaceful persuasion in 'labor disputes' .... The tendency of legis-
[VOL. 15
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the anti-injunction acts posits a further problem which can only be
noted in passing-that of the connection between the "secondary boy-
cott" and the "jurisdictional dispute." The Norris-LaGuardia Act
by its definition of "labor dispute" eliminates the necessity of the em-
ployer-employee relationship in the permissible area of struggle. 25 The
Washington court on the other hand, has delineated the "lawful labor
dispute" in terms of the empIoyer-employee relationship, and has de-
termined that an outside union cannot peacefully picket nor exert other
pressure on R when none of its members are employees of R, irrespec-
tive of. whether the union seeks to displace non-union employees 26 or
members of a rival labor organization.17
In this connection the Thornhill case may prove pregnant with possi-
bilities. Is the "labor dispute," which E has a constitutional right to
publicize, to be delineated by the statutory decisions as to what con-
stitutes a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act?28 Or may
the Thornhill case be limited to its facts, holding that there is a con-
stitutional privilege "effectively to inform the public of the facts" 29
only when. the proximate relationship of employer-employee exists?
Our concern, however, is with the extent to which labor may exert
pressure against third parties. It is conceivable-in the "jurisdictio'al
dispute" to view the union bringing pressure upon R as E and the
rival union or non-union group as T, the third party, under which
view the. situation would fall within the analytical concept of a "sec-
ondary boycott." Such analysis, however, finds no judicial acceptance
and the relationships with third parties which the precepts of the "sec-
lation has been to countenance conduct such as that set out in the indict-
ment by providing that it does not give rise to even a civil action...
That which does not amount to a civil wrong can hardly be characterized
as criminal." See also Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W.
270, 273 (1936).
'47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 et seq. (1932).
"Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U. S. 468, (1937); Lauf v. Shinner, 303
U. S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U. S. 552
(1938).
Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935).
Accord: Fornili v. Auto Mechanics, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422 (1939).
See also S. & W. v. Retail Delivery Drivers, No. 320, 491, King Co. Super.
Ct. June 15, 1940. Cf. Senn. v Tile Layers' Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937);
Lauf v. Shinner 303 U. S. 323 (1938).
"Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397
(1936). Accord: United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P.(2d) 772 (1939); Bloedel Donovan Lbr. Mills v. Intern'l Woodworkers, 104
Wash. Dec. 80, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940).
-This position could still be reconciled with the recent Washington
decision, Bloedel Donovan Lbr. Mills v. Intern'l Woodworkers, 104 Wash.
Dec. 80, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940). The view that the employer-employee
relationship is not necessary to the existence of a "labor dispute" is not
inconsistent with the position that there can be no "labor" dispute between
the employer and a minority group demanding bargaining recognition in
face of a National Labor Relations Board certification of another union
as the exclusive bargaining agency.
From the majority opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 745
(1940).
1940]
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ondary boycott" have protected from "coercion" have been other than
employment relationships. The same protection is afforded T irrespec-
tive of whether pressure is being brought by employees of R or an
outside union.30 In short it appears that the cases make no distinctions
as to limits of permissible pressure against T in those situations involv-
ing a "jurisdictional dispute," and the scope of labor's activity is de-
limited in terms of the same factors which govern the traditional "sec-
ondary boycott."'" To this end E will be used to designate union labor
irrespective of whether or not the employer-employee relationship exists,
and cases involving the jurisdictional dispute will be referred to only
in so far as they involve pressure against third parties.3 2
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
As indicated above, unquestioned recognition has now been accord-
ed the legality of the peaceful picketing of R by E, albeit an objective
is admittedly to influence T. In order to obviate a burdensome and
probably useless citation of the all too numerous cases in this type
situation of the analytical "secondary boycott," the cases involving
union activity in geographical proximity to the employer's place of
business have arbitrarily been eliminated from treatment. The thread of
consistency sought to be followed has been the inquiry as to whether
or not the activities of E have centered solely "in the vicinity of the
place of business of an employer." 3 '
Any attempted classification of the cases along the lines of the pur-
pose for which pressure is being exerted by E proves fruitless. Whether
or not the objective be higher wages,'3 4 shorter hours,3 5 better working
conditions," a closed shop,' or other aims, the nature and extent of
the activity which E may direct against T remains unaltered. There
'Compare Evening Times v. Amer. Newspaper Guild, 122 N. J. Eq. 545,
195 AtI. 378 (1937), 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598 (1938), with United Union
Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939). See also Pac.
Type Co. v. Intern'l Typo. Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923).
"See, for example, United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474,
493, 93 P. (2d) 772, 781 (1939).
"Such type situations may be found in Central Metal Corp. v. O'Brien,
278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio 1922); O'Brien v. Fackenthal, 5 F. (2d) 389
(C. C. A. 6th, 1925); J. C. McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, 6 F. (2d) 1016 (N. D.
Ohio 1925); U. S. v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940), cert.
granted, April 29, 1940, 8 U. S. L. Week 726; Smythe Neon Sign Co. v.
Local Union, - Iowa -, 284 N. W. 126 (1939); Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906); Martin v. Francke, 227 Mass. 272, 116 N. E. 404
(1917); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2 (1931);
Nat'l Steamfitters v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902); United
Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939).
"From the majority opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 743
(1940).
"My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721 (1905).
"A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.)
748 (1909), 221 U. S. 418 (1911), 233 U. S. 604 (1914).
"Marx & Haas Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391 (1902).
'Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. A. A. 7th,
1908).
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appear to be no degrees of legitimate labor activity-a purpose is either
legal or illegal.38
It is perhaps inevitable that 'in dealing with the kaleidoscopic mani-
festations of the "secondary boycott," the number of whose forms has
been limited only by the ingenuity of its creators, that the courts have
succeeded only in bringing confusion out of chaos. Recognizing the
futility of attempting to analyze or reconcile the cases upon the nomi-
nalism there found, it is believed that a helpful dissection of the "sec-
ondary boycott" can best be made in the factual terms of two im-
portant variables-first, the status of T, i. e., the position of the third
party against whom pressure is directed; and second, the form which
that pressure takes, cognizance being taken of the fact that any given
case may involve combinations of both variables. The ineptitude with
which legal research lends itself to the methods of the laboratory tech-
nician and the fact that a composite situation as seen by the trial
judge is frequently more persuasive than his bare and sketchy recitation
of facts must be borne in mind. Keenly aware of these limitations, 'we
turn to the decided cases.
In by far the greater number of cases embracing a "secondary boy-
cott" the place of T has been occupied by customers of R.39 In other
cases T has been a supplier either of materials or services.40 In a few
situations pressure has been directed at persons more remotely con-
nected with R, as for example customers or suppliers not of R but of
R's customers or suppliers,41 situations which have been characterized
as "tertiary boycotts." 42
'Such union objectives as higher wages, shorter hours, better working
conditions, closed shop and collective bargaining are now universally
recognized as legitimate. The Washington court, among others, however,
has declared that attempts by an outside union to displace non-union or
rival union labor constitute an unlawful purpose. See United Union Brew-
ing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 487-490, 93 P. (2d) 772, 778-779 (1939).
The following miscellaneous purposes have been held improper union
objectives: Enforcing uniform closing hours, Quinton's Market v. Pat-
terson, - Mass. -, 21 N. E. (2d) 546 (1939). Contra: Ex parte Lyons,
27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938). Preventing use of labor
saving devices, Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th,
1897); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881
(1894). But cf. Opera on Tour v. Weber, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (1940).
Altering methods of marketing, Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., v. Milk
Wagon Drivers, 108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct.
723 (1940); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers', 371 Ill. 377, 21
N. E. (2d) 308 (1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 1092 (1940); R. & W. Hat Shop
v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922). But cf. W. F. Const. Corp. v.
Hansen, 293 N. Y. Supp. 170 (1937) Forcing hiring of additional employees,
Wohl v. Bakery Drivers, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1939). But cf. Senn v. Tile
Layers Ass'n. 301 U. S. 468 (1937); Zaat v. Bldg. Trades Council, 172 Wash.
445, 20 P. (2d) 589 (1933). Forcing abandonment of individual employment
contracts, Moore Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919
(1923).
"See cases cited infra notes 46, 52, 56, 62, 63, 64 and 69.
'See cases cited infra notes 47, 53, 57, 62, 63, 64 and 69.
"See cases cited infra notes 48, 54, 58, 62, 63, 64 and 69.
'Note (1923) 23 COL. L. Ray. 578.
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The determinative factor in all these situations and the multitude of
variations therefrom appears not to be who fills the shoes of T.
"Coercion" of any third party is illegal. Similarly it seems immaterial
whether E exerting the pressure consists of members of the same local
or international organization or whether E embraces members of di-
vergent labor groups.43 The determinant is whether or not the nature
and extent of the pressure utilized by E against T amounts to "coer-
cion."
Actual force. The employment of actual force or violence against T
is, of course, recognized as illegal; 44 similarly threatening or intimidat-
ing45 T is coercive, although a finding of "threats and intimidations"
may be a verbal catch-all which covers a multitude of sins.
Strikes. Turning to a consideration of the economic weapons em-
ployed by E we find that strikes or threats of strike against T con-
stitute "secondary boycotts" in the eyes of the courts irrespective of
whether T is a customer of R's goods or services," or whether he is a
43Picketing third parties has been held illegal irrespective of whether
the picketing was done by members of the same local, Evening Times v.
Amer. Newspaper Guild, 122 N. J. Eq. 545, 195 Atl. 378 (1937), 124 N. J.
Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598 (1938), or by other labor groups. See Kitty Kelly Shoe
Corp. v. United Retail Employees, 125 N. J. Eq. 250, 5 A. (2d) 682 (1939).
Similarly threats of refusal to handle "unfair goods" have been condemned
whether the threats came from members of the same international, Bed-
ford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37
(1927), or from associations of different internationals. Alfred W. Booth
& Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906). Likewise have threats
of strikes against third parties been deemed unlawful regardless of their
issuance by members of the same international, Pac. Type Co. v. Intern'l
Typo. Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923), or members of other or-
ganizations. Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 23 F. (2d) 426
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 394 (1928).
"In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922); In re Phelan, 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. Ohio 1894);
United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Coal Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th,
1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 536 (1927); Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc.
v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Meadowmoor
Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939); United
Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939).
'Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1887);
R. & W. Inc. v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922); George Jonas Glass
Co. v. Glass Blowers' Ass'n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Ati. 262 (1911); Branson v.
I. W. W., 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); George F. Stuhmer & Co. v. Kor-
man, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1934); Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 841 (1936); Brace Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. Co. 163 (1876); F. R. Patch
Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, 77 Vt. 294, 60 Atl. 74 (1905).
"Threats of strike: Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443
(1920); Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trade Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied 277 U. S. 594 (1928); O'Brien v. Fackenthal, 5 F.
(2d) 389 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); J. C. McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, 6 F. (2d)
1016 (N. D. Ohio 1925); Intern'l Electrical Workers v. Western Union, 6 F.
(2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925); Irving v. Joint Dist. Council, 180 Fed. 896
(C. C. N. Y. 1910); Aberthal Const. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N E.
478 (1907); Armstrong Cork Co v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2 (1931);
Service Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, - Mass. -, 199 N. E. 400 (1936);
Gray v. Bldg. Trade Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663 (1903); Alfred W.
Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Ati. 226 (1906); Kingston Co.
v. Intern'l Union, C. C. H. Labor Law Service, U1 8,647 (N. J. Ch. Ct. 1940);
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supplier of R47 or some other third party.48 It may be interesting to
note that where labor is on strike against -a supplier of R the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has failed to designate this type situation as
a "secondary boycott," being content to observe that "there are in the
books many cases involving the question of 'secondary boycott' which in
their essence are not distinguishable from the principle here involved."4 9
It is generally held, however, that union men may refuse to work with
non-union men on the same job,50 this being true despite the fact that
the union employer may be a third party so far as the non-union fel-
low subcontractor-employer is concerned.
People v. Davis, 144 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1913); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell,
227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. St. 348,
63 Atl. 585 (1906); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Cohen, 34 D. & C. 582 (Pa. Dist. Ct.,
1938) (not enjoinable under state anti-injunction act). Contra: Bossert
v. United Carpenters, 137 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1912).
Strikes: Shine v. Fox Bros., 156 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); Columbus
Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, 17 F. (2d) 806 (W. D. Pa. 1927);
Anderson Co. v. Carpenters' Council, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N. E. 887 (1923);
Mears Co. v. Dist. Council, 156 Ill. App. 327 (1910); Blandford v. Duthie,
147 Md. 388, 128 Atl. 138 (1925); Stearns Lbr. Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45,
157 N. E. 82 (1927), 264 Mass. 511, 163 N. E. 193 (1928); Lohse Co. v. Fuelle,
215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (1908); Beattie v. Pallaman, 81 N. Y. Supp. 413
(1903); Parlser Co. v. Local Union, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (1921).
"Strikes or threats of strikes: Vonnegut Co v. Toledo Co., 263 Fed. 192
(N. D. Ohio 1920), rev'd on other grounds, 274 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921);
A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chi. Typo, Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908);
Bricklayers' Union v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931) ;
Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 592, 78 N. E. 753 (1906); Martineau v. Foley,
231 Mass. 220, 120 N. E. 445 (1918); Schlang v. Ladies Waist Local, 124
N. Y. Supp. 289 (1910); Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1920);
Gatzow v. Bruening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003 (1900). Contra: .U. S. v.
Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo. 1940), jurisdiction noted, 60 Sup. Ct.
898 (1940); Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers' Union, 163 Md. 687,
164 Atl. 752 (1933); Searle Co. v. Terry, 106 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1905); N. Y.
Lbr. Ass'n v. Lacey, 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 688 (1935) (complaint ,dis-
missed on jurisdictional ground), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 684 (1936).
"Strikes against suppliers of R's customers have been held illegal.
Central Metal Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio 1922); Decorative
Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert.
denied, 277 U. S. 394 (1928); N. E. Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N. R.
885 (1914). But cf. Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y.
1914) (violation of criminal statutes not enjoinable). Similarly courts
have not permitted a strike against a customer of R's customer, Columbus
Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, 17 F. (2d) 806 (W. D. Pa. 1927),
or against a connecting carrier with R, Perry Truck Lines v. Intern'l
Teamsters, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1292, 5 L. R. R. 163 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
1939). However, a strike against a supplier of R's supplier has been held
not to be a violation of the Sherman Act. U. S. v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp.
600 (E. D. Mo. 1940), jurisdiction noted, 60 Sup. Ct. 898 (1940).
"Pac. Type Co. v. Internl Typo. Union, 125 Wash. 273, 283, 216 Pac.
358, 362 (1923).
14Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988 (1910); Cohn Co. v. Brick-
layers' Local, 92 Conn. 161, 101 AUt. 659 (1917); Jetton-Dekle Lbr. Co. v.
Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); George J. Grant Const. Co. v. St.
Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 136 Minn. 200,
161 N. W. 1055 (1917); Nat'l Ass'n Steamfitters v. Cunming, 170 N. Y. 315,
63 N. E. 369 (1902). Contra: Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888); Internat'l
Electrical Workers v. Western Union, 6 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925),
46 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); N. E. Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198,
105 N. E. 885 (1914).
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Refusal to handle. In those situations where employees of T have
refused to handle goods manufactured or processed by R or supplies
destined for R, the traditional dogma of the "secondary boycott" has
been written.' Whether T is R's customer' or his supplier' seems to be
a distinction without a judicial difference. Likewise if T is a step re-
moved, being the customer or supplier of R's customer or supplier,_4
the same result follows-illegality.
"Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 447 (1920); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927);
Since the "secondary boycotts" invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court have involved violations of the Sherman Act it may be questioned
whether that court has passed on the status of a "secondary boycott"
per se. See also Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1907), 235 U. S. 522 (1915);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911). Cf. the following state-
ment from Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n,
supra at 50:
"Whether either kind of boycott was lawful or unlawful at
common law was held to be immaterial, and the distinction be-
tween a primary and a secondary boycott was only important to
be considered upon the question of the proper construction of the
Clayton Act."
"'Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1920); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927);
Irving v. Joint Dist. Council, 180 Fed. 896 (C. C. N. Y. 1910); Irving v.
Neal, 209 Fed. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1913); Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades
Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 594 (1928);
March v. Bricklayers' Union, 79 Conn. 7, 63 Atl. 291 (1906); A. P. Stearns
Lbr. Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927), 264 Mass. 511, 163
N. E. 193 (1928); Matthews v. Shankland, 56 N. Y. Supp. 123 (1898);
Albro Newton Co. v. Erickson, 126 N. Y. Supp. 949, rev'd 221 N. Y. 632, 117
N. E. 1059 (1917); Alfred Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl.
226 (1906); Kingston Co. v. Intern'l Union, C. C. H. Labor L. Service, 1
18,647 (N. J. Ch. Ct. 1940); Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. St. 348,
63 Atl. 585 (1906). Contra: Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988 (1910);
J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 158 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027
(1908); Bossert v. United Carpenters, 137 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1912); Bossert
v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917). See Paine Lbr. Co. v. Neal,
212 Fed. 259 (S. D. N. Y. 1913), aff'd, 214 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914);
Patterson & Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 11 Pa. Dist. R. 500 (1902).
53Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1920). But see Iron
Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908).
"Pressure on customer of R's customer: Kingston Co. v. Intern'l Union,
C. C. H. Labor L. Service, 1 18,647 (N. J. Ch. Ct. 1940).
Pressure on supplier of R's customer: Buyer v. Guillam, 271 Fed. 65
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 23 F.
(2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 594 (1928); Aeolian Co.
v. Fischer, 27 F. (2d) 560 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) (temporary injunction denied),
rev'd, 29 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), 35 F. (2d) 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1929)
(permanent injunction denied), rev'd, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
But cf. Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
Pressure on customer of R's supplier: Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351,
104 N. E. 841 (1914); Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 665 (1889). Contra: General Bottle Co. v. Oneto, 12 N. Y. S. (2d)
348 (1939).
Pressure on connecting carriers: Chi. B. & Q. Ry. v. Burlington Ry., 34
Fed. 481 (C. C. Iowa 1888); Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. 149 (C. C. Ga.
1893); Toledo Ry. v. Pa. Co., 54 Fed. 730 (C. C. Ohio 1893); Perry Truck
Lines v. Intern'l Teamsters, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1292, 5 L. R. R. 163
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1939). Contra: P. Reardon, Inc. v. Capon, 178 N. Y. Supp.
713 (1919).
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Picketing. It is in the treatment of those cases involving labor's
most utilized weapon-the picket-that the analytical treatment of
the "secondary boycott" has sunk to its lowest ebb. Again the vast
majority of jurisdictions prohibit any "secondary picketing"" of T re-
gardless of whether T is a customer,' supplier," or is related to R in
some miscellaneous or more remote connection." A few courts have
OSee Evening Times v. Amer. Newspaper Guild, 122 N. J. Eq. 545,
195 At. 378, 379 (1937); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers', 124 N. J. Eq. 147,
200 AUt. 553, 554 (1938).
"Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th,
1936); Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 108 F.(2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Connolly, 2 L. R. R.
Man. 854, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 589 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938); Citizen-News
v. Connolly, 2 L. R. R. Man. 856, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 672 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1938); Bulletin Pub. Co. v. O'Connor, 5 L. R. R. 243, 1 C. C. H. Labor
Cases 1309 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1939); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon
Drivers, 371 II. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 1092(1940); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers, - Ill. -, 22 N. E.
(2d) 962 (1939); Hendrickson Truck Co. v. Intern1 Ass'n, - Ill. -, 22
N. E. (2d) 969 (1939); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 1 Prentice Hall
Labor Service, fI 22,167 (Ill. 1940); Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union,
- Iowa -, 284 N. W. 126 (1939); Evening Times v. Amer. Newspaper
Guild, 122 N. J. Eq. 545, 195 Atl. 378 (1937), 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 AUt. 598(1938); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers, 124 N. -J. Eq. 147, 200 AU. 553 (1938);
Buskirk Sign Co v. Sign Painters, 5 L. R. R. 573, C. C. H. Labor Law
Service, 9T 18,471 (N. J. Eq. 1939); Meyer Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union,
18 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 457 (1916); George Stuhmer & Co. v. Korman, 269
N. Y. Supp. 788 (1934); Amer. Gas Stations v. Doe, 293 N. Y. Supp 1019(1937); B. Gertz, Inc. v. Randau, 295 N. Y. Supp. 871 (1937); Weil & Co.
v. Doe, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559'(1938); Long Island Drug Co. v. Devery, 6
N. Y. S. (2d) 390 (1938); Chapman v. Doe, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 470 (1938);
People v. Bellows, 281 N..Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939); Silvergate v.
Kirkman, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 505 (1939); Wohl v. Bakery Drivers, 14 N. Y.
S. (2d) 198 (1939); Sol Katzman v. Kirkman, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 903 (1940);
Alliance Auto Service v. Cohen, 35 D. & C. 373 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1939); United
Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939); But see
Justin Seubert, Inc. v. Reiss, 164 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1917); Canepa v. Doe,
277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d) 790 (1938). Contra: Sunset Poultry Market v.
United Cannery Workers, 5 L. R. H. 380 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1939); Gamberalli
v. Oneto, 1-A L. R. R. Man. 720 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1937); Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); Willoughby Camera Stores v.
McDonough, 4 L. R. H. Man. 842, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1171 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1939); Alexander v. Doe, 4 L. H. H. Man. 877 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
In the following cases the court refused to issue an injunction under
the applicable anti-injunction act: Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2d) 948
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. Intern'l Ass'n, 29 F. Supp. 15(E. D. Mo. 1939); Hydrox Co. v. Doe, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1937); Davega-
City Radio, Inc., v. Randau, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (1938); Devon Co. v. Lev-
inson, 5 L. R. H. 496, 1 Prentice Hall Labor Service, f 22,162 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1940); Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270 (1936),
aff'd on other grounds, 301 U. S. 468 (1936). See also cases cited note 93
infra.
5.ronnegut Co. v. Toledo Mach. Co., 263 Fed. 192 (N. D. Ohio 1920),
rev'd on other grounds, 274 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921); Wohl v. Bakery
Drivers Local, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1939); Feldman v. Weiner, 17 N. Y. S.(2d) 730 (1940). Contra: U. S. v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E. D. Mo.
1940), jurisdiction noted, 60 Sup. Ct. 898 (1940).
rPerry Truck Lines v. Intern'l Teamsters, 5 L. R. H. 163, 1 C. C. H.
Labor Cases 1292 (Col. Dist. Ct. 1939); Quinton's Market v. Patterson, -
Mass. -, 21 N. E. (2d) 546 (1939); Lyon & Healy v. Piano Union, 289
1940]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
accorded labor the permission to exert economic pressure"6 in the form
of picketing T60 but have felt constrained to verbal consistency and
have found no "secondary boycott.""'
Unfair Lists. With reference to "unfair lists," the courts have pro-
hibited placing T's name on such lists62 and the early decided cases
prevented E from notifying T that R is on an unfair list.0 3 Similarly
most of the early decisions found "coercion" in a concerted refusal to
patronize T.64 The more recent attempts to achieve these ends have
been viewed by the courts as mere peaceful circulars carrying the in-
formation that R is unfair and as such usually will not be banned.65
Solicitation. In general where E has employed only "peaceful per-
suasion" against customers or other third parties the courts have not
Ill. 176, 124 N. E. 443 (1919); State v. Jacobs, 7 Ohio, N. P. 261 (1899);
Intern'l Ass'n v. Fed. Ass'n, - Tex. -, 109 S. W. (2d) 301 (Tex. Civ.
App 1937). Contra: Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 Pac. (2d) 190
(1938).
"The position has been taken by some commentators that picketing
can only be viewed as a means of publicizing a labor dispute. See Heller-
stein, op. cit. supra note 3, at 350. A more realistic view, however, would
seem to recognize that a picket line may well be the means of economic
or psychological pressure as well as a source of information.
'See discussion infra pp. 155-157. See also cases cited supra notes 56, 57
and 58.
"'See Lehman, J., concurring in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281,
11 N. E. (2d) 910, 914 (1937).
'Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1907), 235 U. S. 522 (1915); Gompers
v. Buck's Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co,
33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 748 (1909), appeal dismissed as moot,
219 U. S. 581 (1911); Shine v. Fox Bros., 156 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907);
Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841 (1914); Branson v. I. W. W.,
30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); McAllister v. Bldg. Trades Council, 12 Ohio
Dec. 179 (Ohio Co. Ct. 1938). But cf. Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed.
111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
'Gompers v. Buck's Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); A. F. of L. v. Buck's
Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 748 (1909); Seattle Brewing
Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. Cal. 1905); Shine v. Fox Bros., 156
Fed. 357 (C. C. 8th, 1907); Irving v. Neal, 209 Fed 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1913);
Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C C. A.
2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 594 (1928); Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83
N. E. 928 (1908); My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721
(1905); Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479
(1920); A. T. Stearns Lbr. Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927),
264 Mass. 511, 163 N. E. 193 (1928); Branson v. I. W. W., 30 Nev. 270, 95
Pac. 354 (1908); Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl.
226 (1906); Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620 (1888). But cf.
Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663 (1903).
"Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1907); Gompers v. Buck's Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418
(1911); A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 748 (1909); My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721
(1905); Branson v. I. W. W., 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); People v.
Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 403 (1886); Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927,
6 S. E. 620 (1888). Contra: Marx & Haas Co. v. Watson, 215 Mo. 421, 67 S.
W. 391 (1902); Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, 63 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107
(1917); Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 (1894).
"See cases cited infra note 69.
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intervened."" Where, however, the "peaceful persuasion" of T is per-
sonalized, 7 the difference between such "persuasion" and a threat of
strike or refusal to handle is possibly "that between tweedledum and
tweedledee." '0 8 This consideration may perhaps be the invisible golden
thread of reconciliation running through the chaotic maze of cases
wherein the courts have apparently at will enjoined or refused to en-
join the dissemination of letters and circulars6 or other modes of
"See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 433, 466 (1921), and
cases cited infra note 69.
"Personal or telephone calls or other forms of personalized communica-
tion with T are usually held illegal. A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co., 33
App. D. C. 83, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 748 (1909); Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389,
83 N. E. 928 (1908); Lohse Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (1908);
George F. Stubmer & Co. v. Korman, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1934); Grandview
Dairy v. O'Leary, 285 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1936); Bellevue Brewing Co. v.
Intern'l Union, 12 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 257 (1911); McAllister v. Bldg. Trades
Council, 12 Ohio Dec. 179 (Ohio Co. Ct. 1938); White-Allen Chev; Inc. v.
Auto Mechanics, 12 Ohio Op. 288 (Common Pleas Ct. 1938); Crump v.
Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620 (1888). Contra: Boyd v. Lbr. Union,
4 L. R. R. Man. 864 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 20, 1939); Marx & Haas Co. v.
Watson, 215 Mo. 421, 67 S. W. 391 (1902).
"Hough, J., in Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111, 115 (S. D.
N. Y. 1914).
"The dissemination of peaceful informative circulars or letters is gen-
erally upheld. Truax v. Bisbee Local, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121 (1918);
J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027
(1908); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed. of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127
(1908); Iverson v. Dilno, 44 Mont. 270, 119 Pac. 719 (1911); Empire Theater
Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917); Finsheimer v. United Gar-
ment Workers, 28 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1894); People v. Radt, 71 N. Y. Stupp.
846 (1900); Cohen v. United Garment Workers, 72 N. Y. Supp. 341 (1901);
Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typo. Union, 100 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1906); Perfect
Laundry v. Marsh, 120 N. J. Eq. 508, 186 Atl. 470 (1936); Senn v. Tile
Layers Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270 (1936), aff'd, 301 U. S. 468 (1936).
Where, however, circulars or letters contain false or fraudulent ma-
terial, their publication is generally restrained. U. S. v. Raish, 163 Fed.
911 (S. D. Ill. 1908); Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. Intern'l Ass'n, 29 F. Supp. 15
(1939); Hotel News Co. v. Leventhal, 243 Mass. 317, 137 N. E. 534 (1922);
A. Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union, 84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 Atl. 182 (1915);
Gambarelli v. Oneto, 1-A L. R. R. Man. 720 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 1937).
In a great many of the decided cases, particularly the early decisions,
the courts have prohibited the distribution of letters or circulars in addi-
tion to the other union activities in furtherance of a "secondary boy-
cott". Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. 135 (C. C. Ohio 1891);
Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co. v. Mont. Fed. of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 (C. C.
Mont. 1907); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F. (2d) 560 (S. D. N. Y. 1928),
aff'd 29 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), permanent injunction denied, 35
F. (2d) 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), rev'd, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930);
U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Heslop, 39 F. (2d) 228 (N. D. Iowa 1930); State v.
Glidden, 55 Con. 46, 8 Atl. 890 (1887); My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100
Md. 238, 59 Ati 721 (1905); Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N. E.
304 (1917); Martin v. Francke, 227 Mass. 272, 116 N. E. 404 (1917); W. A.
Snow Iron Works, Inc., v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 387, 116 N. E. 801 (1917);
Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (1920); Moore
Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919 (1923); Beck v. Rail-
way Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Lohse Co. v. Fuelle, 215
Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (1908); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq.
101, 30 At. 881 (1894); Thompson Mach. Co. v. Brown, 89 N. J. Eq. 326,
104 Atl. 129 (1918); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers, 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200
AtL. 553 (1938); Bellevue Brewing Co. v. Intern'l Union, 12 Ohio N. P.
(N. s.) 257 (1911). But see Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 215 Fed. 111, 115 (S.
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soliciting support for labor's cause.70
An additional problem, which can be but mentioned, is the extent to
which the courts have been influenced by the existence of contractual
relationships that may be affected by the pressure being exerted by E.
The early decisions branded as illegal any activity by E which resulted
in forced alteration of R's contractual relations with his employees,7 1
customers,7 2 or other third parties.73  More recent decisions,"4 and in
particular the New York cases,'" have indicated that so long as E is
pursuing legitimate ends and is utilizing "legal" pressure, the fact that
contractual relationships may be altered is immaterial." The sanctity of
the contract finds scant judicial exposition in current labor decisions.
A more modern phase of this problem, and one which has as yet occa-
sioned but sparse judicial recognition, is the effect to be given a con-
tract between E or its affiliated labor organization and T which stip-
ulates for certain results which E could not bring about by resort to
economic pressure.77 For example, if E or the central labor organiza-
tion with which E is affiliated has a contract with T that T will not
handle "unfair" goods, 7  what effect will this contract be given in a
D. N. Y. 1914); Richter Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint
45 (1890).
'°Advertising by the unions is generally upheld. Lisse v. Local Union,
2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314 (1935); Philip Henrici Co. v. Alexander,
198 Ill. App. 568 (1916); Lietzman v. Radio Station WCSL, 282 Il1. App.
203 (1935); Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1891); State v. Van Pelt,
136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904); Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26
Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 (1894); Contra: Campbell v. Motion Picture Operators,
151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781 (1922).
Similarly use of a sound truck has been upheld. Kirmse v. Adler, 311
Pa. 78, 168 Atl. 566 (1933). Contra: Evening Times v. Amer. Newspaper
Guild, 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598 (1938).
7"Bittner v. W. Va. Co., 15 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Kinloch Tel.
Co. v. Local Union, 226 Fed. 312 (E. D. Mo. 1920).
-'-O'Brien v. Fackenthal, 5 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Intern'l
Brotherhood v. Western Union, 6 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925); Aberthaw
Const. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mass. 208, 80 N. E. 478 (1907); C. F. Carroll
v. Chesapeake Co., 124 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903).
"J. C. McFarland Co. v. O'Brien, 6 F. (2d) 1016 (N. D. Ohio 1925); R.
& W. Hat Shop v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922); Blandford v.
Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 Atl. 138 (1925).
-'Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 308 Ill. 488,
139 N. E. 887 (1923); Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union, - Iowa -,
284 N. W. 126 (1939). But cf. McAllister v. Bldg. Trades Council, 12 Ohio
Dec. 179 (Ohio Co. Ct. 1938).
'
5Stillwell Theater v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Sol
Katzman v. Kirkman, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 903 (1940); cf., I. R. T. v. Lavin,
247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928).
'The bulk cases contain no discussion of the effect of contractual rela-
tionships. See J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98
Pac. 1027 (1908); Stillwell Theater v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63
(1932). Cf., however, Bricklayers Union v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md.
483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931) with Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers Union,
163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752 (1933).
-See Shine v. Fox Bros., 156 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
"'Such a contract, containing provisions similar to those found in many
modern union contracts, was involved in Swift & Co. v. Amalgamated Meat
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jurisdiction which forbids E to picket or otherwise "coerce" T into re-
fusing to handle such goods? Is there now a dispute between E and T, a
legitimati purpose for pressure on T? Has this contract established
such a "primary" relationship between E and T that picketing of T
is no longer a "secondary boycott"? Or will the threat of a picket line
on T if he fails to live up to his contract lead the courts to treat the
situation the same as one involving no such contract? The decided
cases lend little support for prognostication, but it may not be amiss
to 'suggest that such a contract will probably not, in the eyes of the
courts, legalize a "secondary boycott" which would otherwise be felled
by the judicial ax.79
By way of summary it may be concluded that the law as derived
from the decided cases by and large prevents the direction of any
pressure against T, irrespective of T's relationship with R, the decisions
of New York being the notable exception. 81 Where, however, the activ-
ity of E consists entirely in the peaceful dissemination of information
and "peaceful persuasion" of T, the courts have generally failed to
find a "secondary boycott." From here the cases fade off into the
shadowy penumbra of illegal "coercion."
When peaceful dissemination of information and requests (or the
peaceful picketing of T in a few jurisdictions) ripens into "coercion"
can perhaps better be answered by reference to the unwritten law than
to the books.81 In truth the "peaceful" picket or innocuous "unfair"
list may be the "talismanic symbol"8 12 of a concerted policy of "refusal
to handle" on the part of organized labor. And yet the cloaking of
judicial reasoning in such intangibles as "coercion" may perhaps be
more understandable than the jurisprudential realist would concede.
Whether or not T has in truth been "coerced" may depend not only
upon the reported facts but also upon such factors as "the social and
economic ideas of judges," 83 the size and strength of the union, its
Cutters, No. 318647 King County Super. Ct., judgment of dismissal entered
April 23, 1940. Meat Cutters Local No. 81, an affiliated local with Packing
House Workers' Local No. 186 to which the employees of Swift & Co.(R) belonged, had negotiated contracts with various butcher shops (T),
customers of Swift & Co., which provided that "Employers shall, upon
request of the Union, discontinue purchasing supplies from concerns that
have been declared unfair by the State Federation of Butchers and the
Central Labor Council .... .
"Buyer v. Guillam, 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Stearns Lbr. Co. v.
Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927), 264 Mass. 511, 163 N. E. 193(1928); Service Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, - Mass. -, 199 N. E. 400 (1936);
cf. Maisel v. Sigman, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807 (1924).
ISee discussion infra, page 155 et seq.
"Typical judicial findings of "coercion" from apparently unreported
facts may be found in Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928 (1908);
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011, 1015 (1900). But cf. Long-
shore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 (1894).
"From the opinion in A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83,
32 L. R. A. (x. s.) 748, 762 (1909).
3From the dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Duplex Printing Press
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reputation in the past for "goon squad" tactics, the extent and effec-
tiveness of the union's affiliation with other labor groups, whether or
not the union requests were broadcast generally by circulars or were
effectively directed toward T individually with an inarticulate "or
else"-all of which factors may unconsciously and subtly be reflected
in a jutge's finding of "coercion."
Perhaps this intangible judicial license of decision is but the accou-
trement of those imponderables which find expression not upon the
printed page, but which may permeate the atmosphere of the court room
or community.
UNITY OF INTEREST
Throughout the cases, the courts have sought to prevent "coercive"
union pressure against third parties who are "strangers" to the indus-
trial dispute. "Strangers," the courts argue, should not suffer loss be-
cause of a dispute between two other parties . 4 However, in modern
economic life, founded upon specialization and interdependence, the
apparent simplicity of determining who is a "stranger" is illusory. A
single dispute affects a whole community, albeit slightly, and the action
of each individual has some influence, however remote, on the outcome
of the dispute. Very recently Justice Murphy declared:
"The health of the present generation and of those as yet
unborn may depend upon these matters, and the practices of
the single factory may have economic repercussions upon a
whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. At
merest glance the State and Federal legislation on the sub-
ject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor rela-
tions are not matters of real local or private concern." 5
Hellerstein tersely summarized the idea of social unity in absolute
terms in the statement "Neutrality is impossible."'"
Courts have become increasingly aware of the "facts" of modern
life and, although decisions are not decided by reference to principles of
social unity having the aesthetic symmetry of absolutes, it is in those
cases involving pressure upon third parties, suppliers or customers of R,
that the New York courts have evolved the concept "unity of interest"
as a criterion for delimiting the sphere of permissible union activities.
Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 485 (1920).
"See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 471 (1920);
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen's Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 44 (1927);
see also In re Phelan, 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. Ohio 1894); Loewe v. Calif. State
Fed. of Labor, 139 Fed. 71 (C. C. Cal. 1905); Quinton's Market v. Patterson,
- Mass. -, 21 N. E. (2d) 546 (1939); Schlang v. Ladies Waists Local, 124
N. Y. Supp. 289 (1910); H. H. Meyer Packing Co. v. Butchers Union, 18
Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 457 (1916); Parlser Co v. Local Union, 87 W. Va. 631,
105 S. E. 911 (1921).
IThornhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 744 (1940).
"Hellerstein, op. cit. supra note 3 at 354. Hellerstein has ably analyzed
the sociological implications of the doctrine of unity of interest which he
espouses.
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Courts are forced to determine how far into the economic life of the
community the union may carry its struggle. "There must in all reason
be a limit somewhere."'
The doctrine of "unity of interest" does not have a long and respected
judicial ancestry." A good statement of the general principle may be
found in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in the Duplex case:
"A single employer might, as in this case, threaten the
standing of the whole organization and the standards of all
its members; and when he did so the union, in order to pro-
tect itself, would naturally refuse to work on his materials
wherever found. When such a situation was first presented
to the courts, judges concluded that the intervention of the
purchaser of the materials established an insulation through
which the direct relationship of the employer and the working-
men did not penetrate; and the strike against the material
was considered a strike against the purchaser by unaffected
third parties .... But other courts, with better appreciation
of the facts of industry, recognized the unity of interest
throughout the union, and that, in refusing to work on ma-
terials which threatened it, the union was only refusing to
aid in destroying itself." 9
The broad language used by Justice Murphy9" in Thornhill v. Ala-
bama raises the question whether the Supreme Court of the United
States has inferentially adopted the "unity of interest" precept. One
California superior court 9 ' has relied on the doctrine in dealing with
a "secondary boycott."
But it is only the New York courts which have examined the doc-
trine in any detail. As enunciated in the leading case, Goldfinger v.
Feintuch,9 2 the principle is a logical development of the New York
rule that E may picket T so long as the pickets bear banners which
refer only to R or his products and contain no reference to T." After
"'From the opinion in Evening Times v. Amer. Newspaper Guild, 124 N.
J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598, 604 (1938).
"See Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F. (2d) 560, 564 (S. D. N. Y. 1928), 29
F. (2d) 679, 681 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), 35 F. (2d) 34, 37 (S.. D. N. Y. 1929);
Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841, 844 (1914); George J. Grant
Const. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W.
520, 523 (1917); Nat'l Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369, 370
(1902).
"'Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 479 (1920).
"Supra p. 154.
D'Sunset Poultry Market v. United Cannery Workers, 5 L. R. R. 380
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1939).
2-276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
"'Public Baking Co. v. Stern, 215 N. Y. Supp. 537, aff'd 215 N. Y. Supp.
908 (1926); Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 232 N. Y. Supp.
886 (1928); Comm'l House v. Awerkin, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1930);
Engelmeyer v. Simon, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (1933); Blumenthal v. Fein-
tuch, 273 N. Y. Supp. 660 (1934); Blumenthal v. Weikman, 277 N. Y.
Supp. 895, aff'd without opinion 279 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1935); Manhattan
Steam Bakery, Inc. v. Shindler, 294 N. Y. Supp. 783 (1937). An extended
discussion of the New York banner cases may be found in Feinberg, op. cit.
supra note 3.
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observing that it is illegal to picket "one who is not himself a party
to an industrial dispute, '94 the court held that a retailer (C) of Ukor,
a non-union sausage, has a "unity of interest" with the non-union
manufacturer (R) with whom the union has a dispute, which justifies
the union's picketing the retailer's (C's) place of business, provided the
banners carried by the pickets refer to the manufacturer (R) only as
"unfair" and contain no reference to the retailer (C). The "unity of
interest" principle was phrased in the following language:
"Within the limits of peaceful picketing, however, picketing
may be carried on not only against the manufacturer but
against a non-union product sold by one in unity of interest
with the manufacturer who is in the same business for profit.
Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages, both it
and the retailers who sell its products are in a position to
undersell competitors who pay the higher scale, and this may
result in the unfair reduction of the wages of union members.
Concededly, the defendant union would be entitled to picket
peacefully the plant of the manufacturer. Where the manu-
facturer disposes of the products through a retailer in unity
of interest with it, unless the union may follow the product
to the place where it is sold and peacefully ask the public to
refrain from purchasing it, the union would be deprived of a
fair and proper means of presenting its plea to the atten-
tion of the public." 95
It must not be assumed that Goldfinger v. Feintuch represents an
unqualified adoption of the sociological precept that "Neutrality is
impossible." '9 6 The court felt constrained to take a more practical and,
it can not be gainsaid, more realistic attitude in determining the limits
of permissible union activity. Finch, J., carefully pointed out that the
broad statement of principle was confined to the facts in the case.
The lower courts in New York have made more elaborate attempts to
prune the principle by restrictive interpretation. In Feldman v. Weiner,
the court announced that:
"The courts, since the Goldfinger v. Feintuch case, have
sought to limit the application of that case to its facts; they
have refrained from broadening the meaning of 'unity of in-
terest' beyond the scope therein.
9 7
The lower courts, in restricting the operative effect of the "unity
of interest" principle, have attempted to establish the following rules
of limitation: The "ultimate consumer," according to one court, is
not in "unity of interest" with a third party (T) who is his sup-
plier (S). 91 It has also been held that the meatpackers' union can not
'Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 912 (1937).
95Id. at 913.
'Hellerstein, loc. cit. supra note 86.
9-17 N. Y. S. (2d) 730, 733 (1940).9
"See Silvergate v. Kirkman, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 505, 506 (1939). Accord:
American Gas Stations v. Doe, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (1937); Weil & Co. v.
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picket a union meatpacking establishment (S) because it supplies a
small part of its product to a non-unioh remanufacturing plant (R)
with whom the union has a dispute, the court stating that the rule in
Goldfinger v. Feintuck is limited to fact situations involving products
manufactured by non-union labor.99 Thus up to the present, it is only
when a retailer of a non-union product'0 0 or a product serviced by non-
union labor' 1 is involved that the New York courts have found "unity
of interest."
It has been pointed out above that an examination of the problem
"secondary boycott" has two aspects: First, which third parties may
be subjected to pressure; and second, what kind of pressure may be
exerted against them.10 2 By the test of "unity of interest" the courts
may determine against whom pressure may be exerted; but the test
does not determine the nature and extent of that pressure. Since
"unity of interest" is not "identity of interest", it does not follow
that T may be subjected to the same pressure as R. Up to the present,
the courts adhering to the "unity of interest" idea have permitted only
peaceful picketing of T,10 3 with the further qualification in New York
that banners must refer to R or the non-union product only and not
to T.104 The few cases have not considered the kind of pressure to which
T may be subjected, but it is anticipated that the principles which gov-
er the balancing of the injury which T suffers against the desirability
of furthering union interests will be determinative in deciding what "co-
ercive" measures E may take against T. Courts might well consider the
relative strength of the union, the employer and T, the intimacy of
the relationship between R and T, the public injuries resulting from
a widespread rather than localized dispute, along with the multitude
of imponderables which are inevitably concomitants of an involved
factual situation. 0 5
Logically, the "unity of interest" cases impel a more comprehensive
analysis of the two phases of the problem of the "secondary boycott."
In the great majority of "secondary boycott" situations T is subjected
to pressure not only by the aggrieved union, but by other locals of
Doe, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (1938); Canepa v. Doe, 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d)
790 (1938); People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 42 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939); Sol
Katzman v. Kirkman, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 903 (1940).
"Feldman v. Weiner, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 (1940). -
' Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281; 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); Gam-
beralli v. Oneto, 1-A L. R. R. Man. 720 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1937); Alexander
v. Doe, 4 L. R. R. Man. 877 (N. Y. Sup Ct. 1939); Devon Co v. Levinson,
5 L. R. R. 496, Prentice Hall Labor Service, ff 22,162 (N- Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
But cf. Wohl v. Bakery Drivers, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1939);.-, ....
"'Willoughby Camera Stores v., McDonough, 1 C. C. H.'Labor'Cases
1171, 4 L. I. R. Man. 842 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). -
"1See discussion supra, p. 141.
2"See cases cited supra notes 91, 100, 101.
"'ISee note 93 supra.
"'See discussion supra, p. 140.- ..... . . - -
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the same international, or by fellow unions.1" 6 Consequently it would
seem that here the courts must face two additional questions: First,
which unions (E') are sufficiently identified in interest with the
aggrieved union (E) to justify their participation in the labor dispute
in any way; and second, what types of pressure may be exerted by E'
against T, assuming that T is in unity of interest with R under the
criteria discussed above.
With regard to the first question, the cases are practically silent.
Although "unity of interest" among unions is not based upon a tangi-
ble economic relationship similar to that between R and T, where
T is R's customer or supplier, nevertheless it must be conceded that all
unions have some interest in the cause of unionism. In any indust.ry
"the practices of the single factory may have economic repercussions
upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing.IO°
Yet, no individual dispute justifies a general attack by all unions
upon T.101 No single employer is such an intimate part of the whole com-
munity that unions "not united by a common interest, but only by
sympathy," 10 9 may take part in the dispute. When attempting to dis-
cover the bounds of "unity of interest" among unions, the court would
properly be assisted by considering such factors as whether the indus-
tries in which they coexist are closely knit, whether the functions which
the respective unions perform are similar, and whether the labor of both
unions is necessary to complete a finished product.110
Although no decisions adopting the rationale of "unity of interest"
have involved the second question posed above, i. e., what pressure
may E' exert on T, it would seem that the character of the activity
"See note 43 supra.
"'Thornhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 744 (1940).
"'In Auburn Draying Company v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97, 100
(1919), a case explicable of the theory that the unions were bringing
pressure upon all third persons dealing with the offending employer, the
court intimated the limit of "unity of interest" among union organiza-
tions when it declared that the dispute "arose because the defendant, con-
stituting the entire population of the city . . .carried on . . .a compre-
hensive exclusion of the plaintiffs from the business of the community,
in order to compel it to unionize its business."
"'Brandeis, J., dissenting in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U. S. 443, 483 (1920).
"Courts will also find some assistance from the presence or absence of
councils made up of affiliated unions: e. g., the Building Trades Council
or the Metal Trades Council. In such cases some unity of interest between
the crafts is apparent. Realistically, it would seem that the same analysis
should apply to a fact situation involving industrial unions such as the
C. I. 0. organizations.
Furthermore, there are no branch divisions in an industrial union, and
a dispute with one section necessarily occasions a dispute with the whole
union, as, for example, the tie-up of the Port of San Francisco followed
a dispute with one small section of the I. L. A., the dock stewards. The
nominal unity of interest within one industrial union is readily apparent,
but the bare fact that the union is organized as an industrial as distin-
guished from a craft union should not be the determinant.
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which E' will be permitted to direct against T will vary with the in-
timacy of the relationship between E and .'. The same factors which
may be persuasive in delimiting the pressure which E may exert against
T are relevant to the inquiry regarding the type of pressure E' may
exert against T.
Every "secondary boycott" involving sympathetic union activity (E
and E!) logically requires two applications of the principles of "unity
of interest" preliminary to any inquiry as to the pressure to be per-
mitted: First, the "unity of interest" between R and T must be de-
termined, and second, the "unity of interest" between E and E must be
ascertained. The decided cases, however, give little promise of the adop-
tion of this approach.
Throughout this discussion we have made reference to the dual
factors involved in determining the legality of any "secondary boy-
cott"; namely, "unity of interest" and nature of pressure employed.
However, it is believed that these questions are not separate and dis-
tinct-rather, is each a variable of the other. "Unity of interest" is
not an absolute and can only be considered in relation to the pressure
against T which is being considered.
Thus, as the degree of "unity of interest" increases from "no in-
terest" at one end of the scale to "identity of interest" at the other
end of the scale, the amount of pressure which should be deemed lawful
will also vary from the "no pressure", which the law admonishes when
there is no real connection between R and T1 1 , to the "same pressure
which E may directly employ against R" where there is an "identity
of interest" between R and T.
Inevitably in practice are merged these two problems which in logic
must be kept distinct. This merger hardly justifies, however, the scut-
tling of judicial analysis in favor of the quagmire of "coercion" or "sec-
ondary boycott."
An examination of the "unity of interest" cases does not lend itself
to neat blanket conclusions. It may be suggested that the concept was
evolved as a recognition of the fact that E's struggle against a modern
large-scale economic unit is ineffectual if E is confined to picketing
the premises of R. The effective focal point for bringing pressure upon
T is in many cases no longer a point near R's doorstep." 2 On the other
"'Of course, when there is no "unity of interest" whatsoever, as for
example where R and T are only members of the same economic com-
munity, E will notwithstanding be permitted to "affect" T by activity which
falls within the scope of E's constitutional prerogative of free speech,
thus constituting "no pressure" in the eyes of the law.
'The potency of the "secondary boycott" as a means of exerting eco-
nomic pressure upon R is evidenced by such famous historical examples
as those involved in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1907) (Danbury
Hatters case) and A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 32 L.
-l. A. (N. s.) 748 (1909), 221 U. S. 418 (1911), 233 U. S. 604 (1914). See
WoLrA, op. cit. supra note 1 at 79-82.
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hand, it is necessary to offset against these facts the injury to T and
other persons removed from the immediate area of conflict. "Unity of
interest" is the result of balancing these conflicting interests.
Perhaps it is inopportune, because of the undeveloped stage of this
phase of the law of labor relations, to suggest the factors which may
or should guide the courts in balancing the exigencies of union strategy
in its "economic war of attrition" against the injury to T which results
when T is subjected to picketing or other peaceful methods of "coer-
cion." It is believed, however, that the following factors may properly
receive judicial consideration. If the relationship between T and R is
so remote that pressure against T can have bit a very indirect effect
upon R, the balance will probably be in favor of protecting T from in-
jury. If T's relations with R are intermittent or casual, the effect on R
will probably be treated as remote. Conversely, if T maintains a direct
current relationship with R as a regular customer, the interrelationship
between T and R justifying the union's pressure upon T is readily
apparent. In the judicial analysis of the type of pressure exerted by E,
it should be relevant to inquire whether or not there are other equally
effective and readily available means of obtaining the results sought.
If pressure against R, or a party in more direct relations with R, is as
effective as pressure against T, the court may conversely refuse to
permit E to exert pressure against T. Ineffectiveness of E's pressure
against R may justify pressure against T. Another factor to be con-
sidered is whether or not E is arbitrarily singling out T as the object
of pressure, while not subjecting other persons similarly situated to the
same treatment. 11" These factors, along with others, including "the
social and economic ideas of judges"" 4 concerning the law of labor
relations, will perhaps be determinants defining the extent of per-
missible union activity in a modern industrial struggle between E and R.
The concept "unity of interest" is as workable as the well established
legal fiction of the "reasonable man."
THORNHILL v. ALABAMA
The reaffirmation of the constitutional right of free speech in a sweep-
ing declaration by Supreme Court of the United States in Thornhill v.
Alabanza11' has opened "vistas of new uncertainties""' 6 in the law of
the "secondary boycott". The court, in holding that peaceful picketing
of R by E for a legitimate union objective is mere exercise of the con-
stitutional right of free speech, has given the lie to ordinances and
decisions declaring such activity illegal. However, because the free
1"George Stuhmer & Co. v. Korman, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1934); Grand-
view Dairy v. O'Leary, 285 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1936).
"'Note 83 supra.
1160 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
"'From the dissenting opinion of Hughes, C. J., in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 1003 (1940).
[VOL. 15
LABOR AND SECONDARY BOYCOTT
speech rationale of the decision is phrased in abstract terms, the case
has raised problems potentially more interesting than the actual ques-
tion disposed of, problems whose analysis necessitates an exercise of
prophetic insight. By deciding that E has the constitutional right
peacefully to picket R, the court gave constitutional sanction to an
activity that other courts had, with virtual unanimity, agreed was
lawful. But does the Thornhill case purport to give E the right, as an
exercise of his constitutional right of free speech, peacefully to picket
third parties? Justice Murphy declared:
"Free discussion [by picketing] concerning the conditions
in industry and the causes of labor disputes appear to us
indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the proc-
esses of popular government to shape the destiny of modem
industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such
as are challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees
effectively to inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute
are part of this larger problem."" 7
A loose interpretation of the broad principles of freedom of speech
and press announced in the Thornhill case might lead one to conclude
that a union has an unlimited right to picket peacefully as, indeed,
one California case, Ex parte Lyons,"" subsequently repudiated,"9
held. Sustaining the right to picket peacefully on a free speech rationale
is not new, 2 0 and it is believed that the Thornhill case does not stand
for the broad proposition that E may place a picket line around T,
whose sole connection with the labor dispute between R and E lies in
the fact that he belongs to the same economic community.' 2' Any in-
terpretation of the abstract statements must be considered in view of
the facts in the Thornhill case; the dispute was "publicized in the
vicinity of thd place of business of the employer.'h
22
1
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 744 (1940).
See also the following statement in Carlson v. California, -60 Sup. Ct.
746, 749 (1940):
"The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising of
a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information
on matters of public concern."
"'27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938).
2"'Citizen-News v. Connolly, 1 C. C. H. Labor Cases 672, 2 L. R. R. Marl.
856 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938). Although the Lyons case was decided by an
intermediate appellate court it has not been subsequently relied upon.
1'See Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 (1937); Truax v.
Bisbee Local, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121, 125 (1918); Ex parte Lyons, 27
Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190, 193 (1938); Marx & Haas Co. v. Watson,
215 Mo. 421, 67 S. W. 391, 393 (1902); Kirnmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 Atl.
566 (1933).
2'=See Perry Truck Lines v. Intern'l Teamsters, 1 Labor Cases 1292, 5
L. R. R.' 163 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1939)- (Plaintiff and R utilized same truck
loading facilities); State v. Jacobs, 7 Ohio N. P. 261 (1899) (Plaintiff's
store patronized by "scabs").*
. =60 Sup. Ct. 736, 743 (1940). Sed. algo Evening "Times v. Amer. News-
paper Guild, 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 Atl. 598, 605 (1938), wherein it is stated:
"We are of the opinion that the lawful place for defendant's
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In view of the language used by Justice Murphy, another possible
limitation on the abstract right of free speech is possible. It has been
suggested above12 3 that some of the language used in the decision
indicates an inferential adoption of the "unity of interest" concept as
a touchstone to determine the legality of the union action. In the
rather unlikely event that Justice Murphy had such an intention, the
federal courts, faced with the necessity of establishing the limits of the
concept, will thereby define the boundaries of the broadly declared
right to picket.
The modern law is in a state of flux; the Thornhill case pointed to
the problems but did not settle the issues. Some assistance in inter-
pretation may be provided by two other recent decisions, which, when
read with the Thornhill case, suggest the judicial limits of the abstract
statement of the right of free speech enunciated by Justice Murphy.
In Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union,"14 the milk
wagon drivers union, in an effort to prevent the dairy from distributing
its milk products through independent "vendors" who purchased the
milk and distributed it in their own trucks to retail outlets, picketed
the retail establishments.12  The court disposed of the union's con-
tention,
"that they may not be restrained or enjoined in any case from
carrying placards bearing thereon printed words conveying in-
formation to the public, because such would violate the guar-
antee of free speech"""'
by pointing out that,
"The privilege of free speech cannot be used to the exclu-
sion of other constitutional rights nor as an exercise of un-
lawful activities."'1
-2 7
Holding that no labor dispute was involved under the Illinois Anti-
Injunction Act, the court issued an injunction on the theory that the
defendant's acts became "what have been called 'verbal acts', and as
such subject to an injunction as the use of any other force whereby
property is unlawfully damaged." 2
In the subsequent case, Lake Valley Farm Products v. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union"29 an action brought under the Sherman Act on a fact
picketing operations is at the site of the employment .
"See discussion, p. 155 supra.
2'371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939), cert. granted, 60 S. C. 1092 (1940).
I'It may be observed that the violence employed by the union had
previously been enjoined by the lower court.
' Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E.
(2d) 308, 316 (1939).
"-Ibid. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931).
'IsMeadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E.
(2d) 308, 317 (1939). See also Gompers v. Buck's Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418,
439 (1911).
1"108 F. (2d) 436 (1940), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 723 (1940).
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situation arising out of the same labor dispute involved in the Meadow-
moor case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after
pointing out that a "secondary boycott" was an "unlawful activity",
3
stated:
"It is contended by appellees, however, that the prevention
of peaceful picketing of the cut rate stores [retail establish-
ments] would be a violation of the constitutional right of free
speech ... although such acts might be considered as a sec-
ondary boycott. We do not understand this to be the law."''
Holding that the fact situation did not constitute a "labor dispute"
within the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the court reversed the decree dis-
missing the action and remanded the cause to the district court.
The Supreme Court originally denied certiorari in the Meadowmoor
case, a case presenting the problem of picketing T as an exercise of
the constitutional right of free speech, but apparently has had some
misgivings and recently vacated its prior order and granted certiorari. 32
Certiorari has also been granted in the Lake Valley case,133 a case in-
volving problems of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act as well as
problems of free speech.
Tentatively it seems proper to inquire, as a result of these cases
as decided, reserving final judgment until the Supreme Court has dis-
posed of the Meadowmoor and Lake Valley cases, whether the present
authorities do not stand for the following propositions: E has a con-
stitutional right peacefully to picket R for legitimate union objectives.
*Apparently E has no constitutional right to picket T. To determine
the right to damages, the legality of E's picketing T will be governed
by the applicable state law under the rule in Erie v. Tompkins,3 4 except
in cases where the union's activity is illegal under the Sherman Act or
other Federal statutes. The enjoinability of such conduct must be de-
termined by a reference to the appropriate anti-injunction statute.
CONCLUSION
Our inquiry into the factors which have seemed to influence the
courts, and our examination of their attempts to define the limits within
which labor may carry on its struggle against an employer by affecting
third parties, justifies, perhaps, but one conclusion: The courts have
attempted to regulate the economic struggle in the public interest as
they have conceived it. Perhaps a judicially expounded theory of
"unity of interest" will supplant the previously inarticulate conceptions
of "public interest."
210Id. at 442.
1'Id. at 443.
3"Cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 128 (1940); cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 1092
(1940).
1"Cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 723 (1940).
1'304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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"Moreover, may it not be judicial to add that, as the ques-
tions trench so closely on the political, they may finally be
solved only by the political departments of the government. '13 5
"1Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590, 592 (1907).
The question may perhaps here be posed as to whether or not the public
interest may demand a settlement of the dispute between R and E by
such political devices as compulsory arbitration instead of trial by combat
in the form of the strike, lockout, boycott and blacklist-whose social cost
has long been recognized. But it is probably not the voice of the skeptic
which would venture that labor will not voluntarily supplant its tested
economic weapons with untried political devices; and until labor is
assured that political pressure will be as effective as its present economic
power such a change will remain in the realm of possibilities rather than
probabilities. See Erskine, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor
Disputes (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 456; Smith and De Lancey, The State
Legislature and Unionism (1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1023 et seq.
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